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I. INTRODUCTION

In response to the myriad new methods of copying that are emerging
from the ongoing digital revolution, Congress has enacted several
amendments to copyright law.' These statutes have sought to protect
copyright holders in the digital age without chilling the development of
new technologies or interfering with consumer access to copyrighted
Specifically, the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
works.
("AHRA") 2 recognized the tremendous potential for piracy created by
consumer access to digital audio recording devices. The purpose of the
AHRA is not only to prevent infringing acts, but also to compensate

copyright holders for the inevitable instances of illicit musical copying
which will result from the capability of these devices to make perfect
copies from perfect copies of perfect copies.3
In drafting the AHRA, Congress deliberately excluded personal
computers ("PCs")4 from its definition of "digital audio recording
devices,"5 in spite of the obvious fact (at least in hindsight) that PCs are,
in reality, the ultimate digital audio recording devices. As a result, PC
manufacturers are not required to contribute to the royalty fund created

by the AHRA to effectuate the compensation element of that Act.
1. See, e.g., Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010
(1994); Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 10439, 109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010.
3. See infra Part IV.A.
4. Throughout this Comment, the author uses the term "PC" to refer to personal
computers of all types (i.e., not limited to machines utilizing the Windows operating

system).
5. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. § 1001. See infra Part IV.A.3.
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Hence, while the act of unauthorized copying may still be illegal, the
AHRA's attempt at a practical solution (i.e., the royalty fund) to the loss
suffered by musical copyright holders has been rendered somewhat
ineffectual by this exemption. To the extent that PCs are used by
consumers to perform illegal duplication of copyrighted musical works,
copyright holders for those works will remain uncompensated for the
resulting losses, in spite of the explicit intentions of the AHRA to the
contrary.
This Comment argues that copyright law should be amended to end
this exemption. As a result, PC manufacturers would have to (1)
contribute a small percentage of their sales to the AHRA royalty fund,
just as DVD, DAT, and CD-R manufacturers already do, and (2) ensure
that their products comply with the AHRA's Serial Copying
Management System requirement, which is aimed at thwarting the
spread of illegal copies of digital recordings. This Comment
demonstrates that this result is fair because PCs are used to copy, send,
and receive digital audio recordings with alarmingly increasing
frequency. As these products are used more and more for digital music
piracy, the injustice of the AHRA's exemption for PCs will continue to
grow unless this loophole is closed.
Part II briefly outlines the development of digital music piracy. Part
El gives an overview of relevant technology. In Part IV, the author
examines recent copyright legislation, focusing in particular on the
AHRA's PC exemption. Part V discusses the only reported case dealing
with the AHRA's PC exemption. The music industry's attempt to
propose a self-regulatory solution to the problem of digital music piracy
is summarized in Part VI. Finally, Part VII explores the probable results

and consequences of ending the AHRA's PC exemption.

II. BACKGROUND OF DIGITAL MusIc PIRACY
Since the advent of the Apple He in the late 1970s, PCs have become a
ubiquitous symbol of modem American life. Once a tool of the
technological elite, PCs are now found in classrooms, farmhouses,
offices, factories, and (perhaps most significantly) homes throughout the
industrialized world. Coupled with the ease of consumer access to the
virtually infinite amount of information embodied by the Internet and
the World-Wide Web, this extremely high proportion of personal
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computer ownership has created a population empowered beyond its
6

own comprehension.
Obviously, not all users of PCs and the Internet limit themselves to the
legal applications of these technologies. Virtually any tool can be used
for legitimate or illegitimate activities; some tools, however, beckon
unscrupulous users to see what they can get away with.' PCs are such

tools. The milieu created by blazing processor speeds, increasingly
speedy connections to the Internet, a seemingly limitless amount of
information (much of it copyright-protected), and a fundamental
ambiance of under-regulation has resulted in widespread digital piracy
of intellectual property of all types.

For a number of reasons, illegal copying of sound recordings
represents one of the most glaring examples of computer-based
copyright infringement today. Though the potential for piracy of literary

works' or of other multimedia products9 exists, popular music is an easy
and attractive target for piracy.'0

The high proportion of relatively

youthful Web surfers, many of whom have been cruising the information
superhighway for years before being licensed to drive, has fueled both

the supply and the demand for illegal copying of copyrighted music.
The result is the availability of many thousands of illegal, yet virtually
CD-quality, recordings on the Web.
6. The author recently spent an evening demonstrating the vastness of the Web to
his 92-year-old grandmother. Her response alternated between exclamations of
bewilderment at the extent of the information available ("But who puts it there?") and
anxious demands for him to make the computer produce the definitive answer to some
point of personal interest to her ("Try looking for the birthplace of Mozart!"). These
polarized feelings of amazement and an impatient desire to harness the almost mystical
powers contained by the "Celestial Jukebox" in order to accomplish personally satisfying
and fulfilling goals typify the relationship among computers, the Internet, and the public
at large: we may not understand how it works, but we quickly figure out exactly what we

want it to do for us.

7. The oxymoronic sale of "street-legal" cars that are capable of exceeding 170
mph, although sold in places where the maximum legal speed is 70 mph, comes to mind.
8. Though one may first think of Shakespeare or Toni Morrison, computer
software also falls into the "literary works" category. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983)
(holding that "a computer program.., is a 'literary work' and is protected from
"). See also H.R. REP. 102-873, pt. 1, at 17 (1992).
unauthorized copying ....

9.

For example, the author knows of at least one individual who downloaded

(free of charge, of course) a copy of the film THE BLAIR WITCH PROJECT (Haxan

Entertainment 1999) prior to the film's release.
10. Digitized sound files are smaller than other multimedia files (e.g., motion
pictures), and hence can be copied, transferred, or transmitted in relatively shorter times.
See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text for more detailed discussion of the ease of
downloading musical files.
11. See LUCAS GRAvES, MEDIA DISTRIBUTION: CONFRONTING THE THREAT OF
MUsiC PIRACY 21 (Jupiter Communications 1999). Graves puts forth that "everyday
music consumers casually posting copies of songs for barter pose a graver piracy threat
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Congress is not oblivious to the increased risk of intellectual property
copyright infringement posed by digital technology. Although it is
fundamentally challenging to enact timely legislation that keeps pace
with technological innovation,' 2 Congress appears to be making an effort
to do so.'3 Indeed, the last decade has seen several significant additions
to and revisions of existing copyright law, many of which are
specifically geared toward these issues. 4 The most important piece of
legislation with respect to digital music piracy is the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992. 5 Unfortunately, the AHRA is fundamentally

myopic16 in its attempt to combat digital music piracy. Specifically, by
exempting personal computers from the AHRA, Congress substantially
eviscerated the Act's ability to accomplish its twin goals of
than the organized interests that mass-produce illegal CDs in covert factories." 1d. The
potential for profitable professional piracy will not vanish from the Internet context; in

fact, it is possible that "for-profit piracy will bring high-end resources to bear for
defeating encryption or watermarking schemes." Id. This underscores the importance of
developing a scheme of compensation for the copyright holders whose materials will be

infringed, whether by everyday consumers or for-profit pirates. That is, because
technological measures may always be defeated by other technological measures, the

devaluation of the copyrighted materials that results from piracy will ultimately be

adjusted for somewhere within the market: if not through a Congressional scheme, then
perhaps through increased cost to the consumer. See infra Part VII.B.
12. Additionally, consider the difficulties faced by the judiciary in keeping up with
rapidly evolving fact patterns in the world of high-tech law. See Stuart Minor Benjamin,

Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Factsand the Appellate Process,

78 TEx. L. REv. 269 (1999) (exploring the inherent complications arising when facts
change between trial and appellate rulings).
13. In a sense, Congress is "damned if they do and damned if they don't" in this
respect. If Congress errs on the side of underlegislating, then novel legal issues resulting
from technological advances unanticipated by existing law will have to be dealt with in
the context of antiquated statutes. If, on the other hand, they take a more proactive
stance and attempt to specifically address novel technologies, the resulting legislation
necessarily will be narrower in its scope and hence more prone to rapid obsolescence.
14. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994);
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109
Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
15. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
1001-1010 (1994)).
16. The short-sightedness which characterizes myopia may adequately represent
Congress's failure to include personal computers in its definition of "digital audio
recording device." 17 U.S.C. § 1001. However, a more accurate ophthalmologic
metaphor might be that the AHRA suffers from a central scotoma, or blind spot in the
middle of its visual field; that is, the omission of personal computers from the
definitional schema of the AHRA may have resulted from Congress's inability to
visualize the central component of the digital landscape before it.
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compensation and prevention.
Ill. THE RELEVANT TECHNOLOGY
A.

The Internet

The word "Internet" still does not appear in most dictionaries.' 7 This
absence embodies the gap between rapidly accelerating technological
advances and the more traditional modes of communication and
language. Most Americans have a pretty good idea of what the Internet
is, yet the word still does not appear in many standard dictionaries.
The Internet is a vast network of networks of computers, located
throughout the world, linked together by telephone and cable lines. It is
difficult to comprehend its size and power due to its fundamental lack of
centralization and physically perceptible characteristics. Indeed, "[t]he
Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network
which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer
networks. It is thus a network of networks."' Because its original
purpose was to enable government defense contractors and researchers
to access and share data easily,' 9 the lack of regulation regarding who
may upload or download what sort of file at what time goes to its core:
From its inception, the [Internet] was designed to be a decentralized,
self-maintaining series of redundant links between computers and computer
networks, capable of rapidly transmitting communications without direct human
involvement or control, and with the automatic ability to re-route
communications if one or more individual links were damaged or otherwise
unavailable. Among other goals, this redundant system of linked computers
was designed to allow vital research and communications to continue even if
portions of the network were damaged, say, in a war."

There are varying estimates of how many mainframe computers
currently compose the Internet and of how many individuals are
connected to this network via personal computers.2' There is no doubt,
however, that the number has grown tremendously since Internet access
17. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1989); WEBSTER'S
ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1989).
18.
(1997).
19.

ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844

See id. at 831. See also Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Battle for the Sole of the Internet,
1994, at 50, 52.
20. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
21. 'The art of estimating how many are online throughout the world is an inexact
one at best. Surveys abound, using all sorts of measurement parameters. However, from
observing many of the published surveys over the last two years... an 'educated guess'
as to how many are online worldwide as of March 2000 ... is 304.36 million." NUA
Internet Surveys (visited June 11, 2000) <http:/www.nua.ie/surveyslhow-manyonline/index.html>.
TIME, July 25,

1170

[VOL. 37: 1165, 2000)

DigitalMusic Piracy
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

became widely available to consumers in 1993.'
It is crucial to recognize that there are several ways that computers
and the Internet can be used to make digital copies of sound recordings.
First, with the appropriate software,' one can easily copy a recording
from a compact disc to the hard drive of a personal computer. Second,
a sound file can be sent directly from one personal computer user to
another by way of e-mail attachment; this type of transmission is
classified in ACLU v. Reno as "one-to-one messaging."' Third, sound
files can be downloaded from the World-Wide Web; this method of
"remote information retrieval" essentially constitutes copying the file to

or from a third-party computer, the location of which may well be
unknown to the PC user.26

B. PersonalComputers and Their Connection to the Internet
As a general rule, processor speeds and memory capacities of personal
computers slip from cutting edge to mediocrity within a period of
approximately eighteen months.27 In late 1999, a new Apple iMac ran at
22. It is difficult to pinpoint the genesis of consumer Internet access. The WorldWide Web was "released" in 1991, but commercial access to it did not occur
immediately. By 1994, however, it was possible to order a meal from Pizza Hut online.
See Dave Kristula, The History of the Internet (visited Oct. 5, 2000) <http://www.
davesite.com/webstation/net-history.shtml>.
23. For example, SoundJam, which can be either downloaded for a free 10-day
trial or purchased, can convert songs from the "au" file format in which they are stored
on a commercially released CD to the highly compressed "MP3" format commonly used
to store and transmit sound files between computers and over the Internet. See infra
notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
24. Due to the definitional schema laid out by the Audio Home Recording Act of
1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994), the Ninth Circuit has recently held that such a
transfer does not constitute a "digital musical recording." Recording Indus. Ass'n of
Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999). See infra
Part IV.A.3.
25. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
26. See id. at 835-36.
27. The idea that high-tech capacities double approximately every 18 months
comes from a principle known as "Moore's Law." For a historical overview of Moore's
Law, see ProcessorHall of Fame (visited Sept. 9, 1999) <http://www.intel.com/intell
museum/25anniv/Hof/moore.htm>. Although Gordon Moore first noticed this trend in
1965 strictly in the context of memory chip performance, the concept has been applied
more generally in recent years. See id. For a discussion of the sustainability of this trend
in the coming decades, see Can Moore's Law Continue Indefinitely? (visited Sept. 9,
1999) <http://www2.computerworld.comlhome/online9697.nsf/All/960722LEADSL
96071ead>.
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333 MHz and was equipped 100 MB of RAM and a 6-GB hard drive.2
However, the purchaser of such a computer must be aware that within
one or two years, a similarly priced machine will be virtually twice as
fast and boast twice as much memory capacity. 29
Additionally, the rate at which personal computers can exchange

information (i.e., send and receive files), both with other PCs and
directly with servers, has increased tremendously since the advent of
consumer Internet access. More consumers than ever are foregoing

traditional modems in favor of connections provided by cable
companies." It seems inevitable that at some point in the near future the
great majority of all Internet access will occur through such connections.
At that point, the time required to transmit data between personal

computers and servers will cease to be a factor for multimedia files such
as digital sound recordings, leading potentially to increased use of the

Internet to send and receive music files.3

This rate of technological change is highly relevant to the issue of

digital music piracy: it begins to illuminate how difficult it is to
anticipate the way in which copyrighted materials will be copied and

transmitted within a period of just a few years.32 Although processor
speed and disk space do not currently represent the most significant ratelimiting steps in online music piracy, they are nevertheless key
ingredients.3
28. As of October, 2000, when this Comment was going to press, the latest iMac
ran at 500 MHz and featured 128 MB of RAM and a 30-GB hard drive. See The Apple
<http://store.apple.com/1-800-MY-APPLE/
2000)
5,
Oct.
(visited
Store
WebObjects/AppleStore>.
29.

See id.

30. The number of "residential high-speed subscribers" (which includes both cable
and digital subscriber line, or DSL) in the United States as of January 2000 is
approximately two million, or roughly five percent of U.S. Internet users. See Cable
Companies Staking Clain in ISP Race (visited June 8, 2000) <http://www.statmarket.

comISM?c=stat042399>. This number is expected to grow to approximately 11 million
by 2002. See id. A "broadband" (i.e., cable or DSL) connection may be as much as 100
times faster than a "dial-up" (i.e., modem and phone line) connection. See infra note 42.
31. If the current rate of change continues, eventually there may be no perceptible
delay between the moment a Web surfer begins to download a file and the moment that
the process is complete; this instantaneous response, contrasted to the minutes currently
required, should add to the appeal of this mode of copying.
32. This, in turn, illustrates the difficulties inherent in ensuring that copyright law
strikes the proper balance between protection of proprietary ideas (which encourages
inventors and authors to harness their creativity) and facilitation of consumer access to
the "fair use" of those creations. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. §§ 107
(1994). It is difficult to legislate (or even articulate) the proper equilibrium point in this
balancing act when the landscape of potential infringement methods is constantly
morphing.
33. One thousand songs converted to MP3 format require approximately 3 GB of
disk space. In 1999, a middle-of-the-road PC could not store this much information. In
2000, an average computer could easily store 1000 songs, but doing so would take up
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C. Audio Files and Compression Thereof.
The Significance of MP3
The potential to make an identical, illegal duplicate of a legally
purchased audio recording has existed for years. 4 Digital audio tape
("DAT") and recordable compact disk ("CD-R") technologies have been
commercially available since the late 1980s. 5 The potentially illegal use
of these technologies was, of course, anticipated by entertainment
industry groups, who were naturally fearful of decreasing sales as a
result of digital piracy.36 Copyright law has responded to the threat
posed by DAT and CD-R,37 but it has not directly confronted the device
that has the greatest potential to be used for illegal copying of CDs: the
personal computer.
In the "au" format, in which a song is stored on a standard music CD,
a three-minute song contains approximately 35 MB of information. For
an average personal computer today, 35 MB is not a hefty file; copying 3a
file this size requires an insignificant amount of processor time. 1
Sending or receiving a 35-MB file over the Internet, however, may take
quite a bit longer, depending on the nature of one's connection.39 When
the Audio Home Recording Act40 was enacted in 1992 copying a 35MB file would have been relatively time-consuming; sending it to
another computer by way of modem and phone line would have been an
roughly half of the available memory. On the personal computers of next year and the

year after that, 1000 songs will require a diminishing percentage of the total disk space.
Hence, in the foreseeable future, the owner of an average personal computer will be able
to store thousands of songs without worrying about disk space limitations. Similarly,
faster processor speeds will allow a PC user to download or upload cyberspace

information at faster speeds. The rate at which uploading and downloading can occur is
dependent primarily on the speed of the modem being used to connect the personal
computer to the Internet, and on the number of users competing for space on the
particular telephone or cable lines at that time (i.e., "bandwidth"). See infra note 42.
34. See H.R. REP. No. 102-873, pt. 1, at 12 (1992).
35. See id.
36. See Michael Gowan, How MP3 Works (visited June 8, 2000) <http://www.
cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/02/03/mp3.works.idg/index.html>.
37. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010.
38. Copying a 35-MB file on the author's 333 MHz iMac takes about five seconds.
39. Using the author's 56K modem on a busy night, it would take several hours to
transmit a 35-MB file. Users with cable connections, on the other hand, could
accomplish the same transfer in just a few minutes.
40. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010.
41. Eight years is virtually an eternity in terms of the amount of change occurring
in consumer-grade (and industrial) computing. See supra note 27 and accompanying
text.

1173

astronomical endeavor.4" This is probably one of the reasons that, at the
time the AHRA was drafted, the threat of PC-based
copying and
43
remote.
seemed
recordings
digital
of
transmission
Since the AHRA was enacted, this distant threat has become an
everyday occurrence, due not only to faster personal computers, but also
to the advent of MP3 technology. MP3, which stands for MPEG-1,
Layer 3,44 is a nonproprietary compression algorithm45 that can reduce
the size of an audio file by a factor of approximately twelve 6 by filtering
out unnecessary or redundant ones and zeroes. It is not only possible,
but downright easy to lift a song from a CD, convert it into MP3 format,
and store it on a computer's hard drive, reducing it from 35 to only 3
MB in the process. 48 The resulting MP3 file sounds nearly identical to
42. For example, downloading Tolstoy's WAR AND PEACE via 14.4K modem (the
standard modem speed in 1993) would require nearly 30 minutes; using a high-speed
cable modem, the same file (approximately 26 MB) could be downloaded in less than a
minute and a half. See Kathryn Balint, It Will Be a Brave New Interactive World, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 16, 2000, at Al. Speed comparisons made by providers of
high-speed Internet access often are much more optimistic; one such provider,
Cox@Home, claims that "downstream speed" (the rate at which information can be
downloaded) using their service may be "up to 100 times faster than a 28.8Kbps
modem."
The
Facts
About
Speed
(visited
Jan.
17,
2000)
<http://www.home.com/speed/>. Although this rate differential admittedly is dependent
on network traffic and individual computer performance, the implications for digital
music piracy are staggering; a 35-MB sound file that would require 20 minutes to
download via a 28.8K modem could be transferred, theoretically, by cable modem in just
12 seconds.
43. See H.R. REP. 102-873, pt. 1, at 17 (1992). See also S. REP. No. 102-294, at
48 01992).
44. See Gowan, supra note 36. MPEG, in turn, stands for Moving Picture Experts
Group. See Naomi Graychase, What Is MP3? (visited Sept. 7, 2000) <http://www.cnet.
com/category/0-4004-7-294826.html?st.int.topOmp3.arrow.ss I> (stating that the
Moving Picture Experts Group is "a consortium that develops open standards for audio
and video compression").
45. Put more simply, MP3 and its predecessors "filter[] out superfluous
information from the original audio source, resulting in smaller audio files with no
perceptible loss in quality." Graychase, supra note 44. Unlike other audio compression
algorithms, both currently in existence and yet to be developed, MP3 technology is in the
public domain, such that anyone may use it. See GRAVEs, supra note 11, at 14. This
public access "guarantees the widespread use of MP3 well into the next decade." Id.
46. This is the default compression ratio for an MP3 file. See Graychase, supra
note 44 ("[T]he MP3 standard will take music from a CD and shrink it by a factor of 12,
with no perceptible loss of quality."). At the expense of losing some of the original
recording's fidelity, it is possible to compress the sound file by as much as a factor of 36.
See Naomi Graychase, Why Do Some MP3 FilesSound Garbled?(visited Sept. 7, 2000)
<http://home.cnet.com/category/0-4004-7-294832.html?st.int.toplOmp3.indexss7.sw>.
All copying, uploading, and downloading of such a file would be three times as fast as
that of a "default" MP3 file. See infra note 49.
47. For an excellent overview of MP3 technology and use, see Naomi Graychase,
10 Questions About MP3 (visited June 16, 2000) <http://home.cnet.com/category/04004-7-294825.html?st.int.toplOmp3.back.sw>. See also Gowan, supra note 36.
48. This process, known as "ripping," was completely unknown to the author until
I
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the original recording,49 and can be transferred, uploaded, or downloaded

in one-twelfth the time that it would have taken to transfer the full "way"
file. Considering that the average popular recording has about twelve
songs on it, the result of utilizing MP3 compression is that an entire
album can be transferred in the time that it takes to transfer one song

without this compression.
The implication of the relative ease and speed of transferring audio

files is the increased use of audio compression technology.'

Taken

together with the parallel increases in processor speeds and connection
rates,52 the logical conclusion is that more and more people will use their
he began research for this Comment. After consulting with a friend who knew how to
"rip" CD's, the author was able to acquire the necessary software and make his first MP3
in less than an hour. He ripped a song by his own band in order to avoid possible
copyright infringement, though current law does not consider an MP3 file on a hard
drive to be a "digital audio recording." See infra Part IV.A.3.
49. It is possible to make an MP3 that is relatively more or relatively less
compressed, depending on the bit rate selected when making the transfer; a 128-kbit rate
is considered the standard, and correlates to the stated compression ratio of 12-1. See
Graychase, supra note 46. At this level of compression, the author was able to notice a
slight degradation of sound quality when comparing the MP3 file to the track on the CD;
some of the higher frequencies appeared to have taken on a warbly, out-of-phase
characteristic. If maintaining the full stereophonic glory of a recording is not a high
priority, a ripper may choose to compress the file even more by transferring at only 32 or
64 kbit. The result is a compression rate of 36-1 or 24-1 rather than 12-1, but a
noticeably diminished sound quality (i.e., the fidelity sounds more like AM radio than
FM stereo). On the other hand, one may also choose to rip at up to 360 kbit. An MP3 of
this variety has only been reduced in size by a factor of about four, but the sound quality
is immaculate; only professionally trained ears will detect degradation of sound quality.
See Gowan, supra note 36.
50. Naturally, future generations of audio compression technologies may be able
to squash music files even more. In fact, some possible successors to MP3 technology,
such as Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) and MPEG-4, already exist. See GRAVES, supra
note 11, at 13.
51. Of course, the potential for legal use of this technology is tremendous. The
legal channels of digital music distribution (for example, MP3.com, an online provider
of legitimate, artist-authorized music files) are generally beyond the scope of this
Comment. Recently, however, the line between legal and illegal digital music has
become less clear; the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), which
represents the interests of the major U.S. recording companies, filed suit against

MP3.com, alleging copyright violation by MP3.com's "Instant Listening" and

"My.MP3.com" services. See Jennifer Davies, Mainstream Proves Troublesome for
MP3.com, SAN DIEGO DAILY TRANSCRIPT, Feb. 2, 2000, at IA; Mike Drummond, An
Irate Recording Industry Sues MP3.com, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 22, 2000, at Cl.
Though four of the five major record labels settled with MP3.com for undisclosed
amounts, U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff ultimately ordered MP3.com "to pay as much as
$250 million to Universal Music Group for intentionally violating its copyrights."
CopyrightRuling Slams MP3.com, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., Sept. 7,2000, at Al.
52. See supra note 30.

1175

PCs to copy, send, and receive digital music files in the coming years. 3
IV. RECENT COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION
A.

Audio Home RecordingAct of 1992

Congress is not oblivious to the threat of digital music piracy. The
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 addressed the burgeoning conflict
between new technologies and intellectual property law using a twoprong attack: (1) establishing a royalty fund to compensate copyright
holders for anticipated digital infringement,; 4 and (2) mandating the
incorporation of copying controls into "digital audio recording
device[s]" in order to prevent serial copying.5 After discussing the
legislative history of the AHRA, this Comment will examine each of
these prongs in greater depth, discuss the crucial defimitions in the Act
which exempt PCs from its reach, and set forth the fundamental problem
which results from this exemption.
1.

Legislative History

As audio recording devices became increasingly available to
consumers throughout the 1960s, the conflict between technology
manufacturers and the recording industry grew. Although the early
analog home recording equipment ultimately posed no serious threat to

copyright holders,56 Congress established copyright protection for sound

recordings with the Sound Recording Act of 1971. Prior to that Act,
sound recordings were afforded no copyright protection whatsoever.58
The advent of digital recording technology took this struggle to a much
53. One indication of the mainstream popularity already enjoyed by Intemet-based
digital music piracy is the appearance of a "Top 10 Pirated Internet Tracks" chart on the
last page of ROLLING STONE. See, e.g., Charts,ROLLING STONE, Oct. 28, 1999, at 120.
54. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-1007 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994).
56. Analog recordings degenerate noticeably with every generation of removal
from the original. A copy of a copy of a copy may be virtually unlistenable; the threat of
widespread high-quality piracy of sound recordings, therefore, was minor. Although the

music industry may have perceived analog home recording technology as posing a great
threat to copyright, such fears ultimately proved unfounded: small-scale analog-based
bootlegging of copyrighted recordings may have been commonplace, but it did not
threaten the viability of the industry to the degree that digital copying does.
57. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.).
58. "Although musical works have long been copyrightable, sound recordings
became copyrightable for the first time in February 1972 under the 1971 Sound
Recording Act." S. REP. No. 102-294, at 30 (1992).
59. Digital recording technology was first used on a commercial level (i.e., in
professional recording studios) in the early 1970s; consumer-grade digital recording
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higher level; unlike reel-to-reel and cassette tape recorders, digital
recording devices allow serial copying with virtually no resultant loss of
sound quality. 6° Sound recording copyright holders now had something

about which to be deeply concerned.
The direct origins of the AHRA date back to February 5, 1987, when
(then) Senator Al Gore first introduced legislation to require digital
audio recording equipment to incorporate copy protection measures.61

At that point, the consumer electronics industry and the recording
industry had already been in negotiations for several years 62 in an
attempt to find a solution to the problems arising out of consumer access
to digital recording technology.3 It is interesting to note that the
discussion surrounding this ancestor of the AHRA focused on the threat
posed by DAT recorders being imported from Japan, and apparently did
not consider the possible role of PCs in digital music copying.64 During

the late 1980s and early 1990s, PCs simply did not pose a significant
threat to music copyright holders, especially compared to the very real
threat posed by DAT machines. What started out as an omission arising
from the technological limitations of the day ended up as a deliberate
exemption in response to pressure by electronics manufacturers. 6
By the time Senate Bill 1623 was being considered by the Senate, 6,
Congress was no longer unaware of the potential for personal computers
technology (i.e., digital audio tape, which is also used commercially) did not surface
until the mid-1980s.
60. Hence, a copy of a copy of a copy will be indistinguishable from the original
recording, unless perhaps the listener has really good ears.
61. See S. REP. No. 102-294, at 31.
62. The direct origins of this conflict date back to Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). In that landmark case, the Supreme Court held
that the home recording of publicly broadcast television programs for subsequent, noncommercial viewing (a process referred to as "time shifting") was a fair use of those
copyrighted materials. See id. at 455. See also infra note 152 and accompanying text.
63. See S. REP. No. 102-294, at 32-33.
64. See, e.g., 133 CONG. REc. S2622-01 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1987) (statement of
Sen. D'Amato). See also 133 CONG. REc. S1929 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1987) (statement of
Sen. Gore). The definition of "digital audio recording device" in the Digital Audio
Recorder Act of 1987, as introduced by Senator Gore, was extremely broad: "A 'digital
audio recording device' is any machine or device, now known, or hereafter developed,
which can be used for making audio recordings in a digital format." Id. at S1930.

Interestingly, this definition likely would have included PCs, even though the Act was
aimed explicitly and exclusively at preventing DAT abuse. See id. at S 1929.
65. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 29 F. Supp.
2d 624, 629 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
66. S. 1623, the Senate's version of what became the Audio Home Recording Act,
was first considered by that body on August 1, 1991. See S. REP. No. 102-294, at 33.
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to make digital audio recordings (DAR). 7 Indeed, the Report on Senate
Bill 1623 contains the following key language: "[N]either a personal
computer whose recording function is designed and marketed primarily
for the recording of data and computer programs, nor a machine whose
recording function is designed and marketed for the primary purpose of

copying multimedia products, would qualify as a 'digital audio
recording device.'.. 8 There is some reason to believe that this language
resulted from political pressure applied by the Consumer Electronics
Manufacturers Association, 9 which had a direct pecuniary interest in
keeping their products out of the reach of the AHRA'70 Congress may
have been persuaded to incorporate this language in part because, at the
time the AHRA was enacted, the potential for personal computers to be
used extensively in digital music piracy was perceived (somewhat
accurately) as no more than a distant threat. It is not surprising that, in
1992, it would have been relatively easy for computer manufacturers to
convince Congress to exclude their products from the AHRA, simply
because at that time their products were not practically useful for making
home recordings. Today, however, that threat has become a reality,
necessitating a change in the statute to reflect technology as it now
exists.
2.

PracticalEffects of the AHRA

The AHRA attempted to balance the interests of two groups:
consumers and copyright holders.1
The purpose of [the AHRA] is to ensure the right of consumers to make
analog or digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for their private,
noncommercial use. Moreover, [the AHRA] contains a royalty payment system
that provides modest compensation to the various elements of the music
industry for the digital home recordings of copyrighted music. In addition, the
[AHRA] contains a serial copy management
72 system that would prohibit the
digital serial copying of copyrighted music.

Hence, the rights of consumers are protected by (1) allowing digital
audio recording devices to be bought and sold with minimal government
regulation, and (2) allowing consumers to make a copy of an original
recording for personal, noncommercial use.73 The AHRA purports to
67. See id. at 35.
68. Id. at 48. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(B)(ii) (1994) for the ultimate statutory
embodiment of this sentiment.
69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
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See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 29 F. Supp. 2d. at 629.
See infra Part IV.A.2.a.
See S. REP.No. 102-294, at 32.

Id. at 30.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994).
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protect the rights of copyright holders, on the other hand, by (1) creating
a royalty fund to compensate them for anticipated copying, 74 and (2)
requiring that digital audio recording devices incorporate a serial copy
management system in order to prevent them from making serial
copies. 5 Hence, a consumer may make a copy of an original recording,
but a DAR device must not be able to make a copy of a copy of an
original recording.76

a. The Royalty Fund
The AHRA mandates that anyone manufacturing (or importing) and
distributing a digital audio recording device (or medium)77 shall pay a
percentage of the transfer price of each such unit into a statutorily

established royalty fund.78 The royalty rate is two percent,79 but may not

exceed eight dollars per unit.y0 The monies that accrue in this fund are to
be distributed between owners of sound recordings and owners of
musical works.8 ' The former group receives two-thirds of the proceeds,
with the remaining one-third going to the latter group.8
Given that the purpose of this fund is "compensation to the various
elements of the music industry for the digital home recordings of
copyrighted music,"83 one might logically assume that the sale of all
devices commonly used to make digital home recordings would generate
such royalties. However, due to the definitional framework of the
AHRA,4 PCs are exempt from this requirement. Although thousands"
74. See 17 U.S.C. § 1003 (1994).
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994).
76. "Serial copying" is defined by the AHRA as "the duplication in a digital
format of a copyrighted musical work or sound recording from a digital reproduction of a
digital musical recording." 17 U.S.C. § 1001(1 1) (1994).
77. The analysis of this Comment is limited to the devices rather than the media.
78. See 17 U.S.C. § 1003(a).
79. See 17 U.S.C. § 1004(a)(1) (1994).
80. See 17 U.S.C. § 1004(a)(3) (1994). The maximum royalty amount for a
"physically integrated unit containing more than 1 digital audio recording device" is $12.
Id.
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 1006 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See infra note 112 for a
discussion of the distinction between sound recordings and musical works.

82.

See 17 U.S.C. § 1006(b).

83. S.REP. No. 102-294, at 30 (1992).
84. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994); infra Part IV.A.3.
85. Though it is impossible to quantify with any precision the number of such
recordings that are created, copied, downloaded, etc., "thousands" represents a
conservative estimate. The immensity of the number of MP3 files online has resulted in
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of digital home recordings are made and exchanged using PCs on a daily

basis, the "various elements of the music industry" 6 intended to be
compensated for such copying receive no such compensation.
b.

The Serial Copy Management System

The Serial Copy Management System provision prevents the
importation, manufacture, and distribution of DAR devices that are

unlimited in their ability to make digital copies of digital copies." That
must
incorporate88specific measures
is, under the AHRA all DAR devices
•
•
The technical
geared toward preventing the copying of a copy.
requirements of the SCMS were set forth in a separate document which
was incorporated by reference into Senate Report 294 on the AHRA."
The AHRA also explicitly prohibits circumventing the requirements of
the SCMS, 0 as well as the encoding of inaccurate information. 9'
3.

ImportantAHRA Definitions

Although, as discussed above, personal computers are entirely capable
of copying digital recordings,92 the AHRA deliberately exempted PCs.93
This exemption is found in two distinct provisions, which this Comment
refers to as the "primary purpose" provision" and the "material object"
the creation of a Web service geared expressly toward helping MP3 users locate,
download, and trade the particular files (i.e., songs) that they are seeking. This service,
Napster, describes itself as "an application that takes the hassle out of searching for
MP3s." Napster, So, What the Heck is Napster? (visited June 19, 2000)
<http://www.napster.com/whatisnapster.html>. The service goes on to promise, "No
more broken links, no more slow downloads, and no more busy, disorganized FTP sites.
With Napster, you can locate and download your favorite music in MP3 format from one
convenient, easy-to-use interface." Id. Napster has been sued by the Recording Industry
Association of America for enabling and encouraging the copying of copyright-protected
recordings. See infra note 185. See also DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT THE Music BUSINESS 385-86 (2000).
86. S. REP.No. 102-294, at 32.

87. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994).

88. See id. For example, through digital encoding, which identifies copyright and
generation status, a DAR device must be unable to make a copy of a digital audio
recording that it perceives already to have been copied from an original. See GRAVES,
supra note 11, at 9.
89. See S. REP. No. 102-294, at 17-30. A detailed exploration of the specific

technical measures necessitated by the AHRA's SCMS requirement is not necessary for
the purposes of this Comment. Suffice it to say that whatever these requirements may
be, they need not be incorporated into personal computers.
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002(c).
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002(d)(1).
92. See supra note 48.
93. See supra Part IV.A.1.
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (1994).
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provision."
a. The PrimaryPurpose Provision
The first part of the AHRA's exemption of PCs is the "primary
purpose" element of the definition of DAR devices:
A 'digital audio recording device' is any machine or device of a type commonly
distributed to individuals for use by individuals, whether or not included with or
as part of some other machine or device, the digital recording function of which
is designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is capable of,
making a digital audio copied recording for private use ....96

This language clearly excludes PCs from the definition of DAR devices,

due to the fact that no personal computer is distributed with the "primary
purpose"' 7 of making "digital audio copied recordings."98 Even if an
individual purchased a PC with the intention of using it solely to make
copies of compact discs, the resulting copies would not be "digital audio
copied recordings" under the AHRA.9
b.

The Material Object Provision

The second facet of the AHRA's personal computer exemption arises

from the definition of a "digital musical recording" as "a material
object.., in which are fixed, in a digital recording format, only sounds,
and material, statements, or instructions incidental to those fixed

95. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(B)(ii) (1994).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3).
97. This term is defined in Senate Report 294 as "a purpose that exceeds 50
percent of all purposes." S. REP. No. 102-294, at 47 (1992).
98. A "digital audio copied recording" is defined as "a reproduction in a digital
recording format of a digital musical recording." 17 U.S.C. § 1001(1) (1994). Senate
Report 294 gives an example: "[A] digital audio recording made from a commercially
released compact disc or audio cassette, or from a radio broadcast of a commercially
released compact disc or audio cassette, would be a 'digital audio copied recording."' S.
REP.No. 102-294, at 47.
99. This conclusion rests on the assumption that the PC in question was not
designed or marketed for the primary purpose of copying CDs. If a PC did have such a
primary purpose, then one may question whether it would still be a PC, or whether
perhaps it would be a new class of machine. Indeed, it seems to be a fundamental
characteristic of PCs that they lack any primary purpose at all, being inherently versatile
tools. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California recognized (and
struggled with) a version of this illogical result of the AHRA's PC exemption, only to be
reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See infra Part V.B.
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sounds."'" This suggests that a song which exists on the hard drive of a
personal computer, which certainly contains more than just "material...
incidental to those fixed sounds,"'' will not be considered to be a digital
musical recording. This impression is confirmed by the subsequent lines
of the AHRA, which clarify that a "'digital music recording' does not
include a material object... in which one or more computer programs
are fixed. ' 'tcc Hence, once a song finds its way onto the hard drive of a
PC, it is no longer a "digital music recording," and is therefore exempt
from the restrictions of the AHRA.
Through the AHRA, Congress sought to compensate music copyright
03
holders for digital music piracy. Nevertheless, the AHRA doubly"
exempts personal computers from this attempt, in spite of the fact that
PCs have become the ultimate digital audio recording device: (1) PCs
are exempt because it is not their "primary purpose" to make digital
audio copied recordings, and (2) PCs are exempt because their hard
drives, on which songs ripped from a CD exist, also happen to contain
materials unrelated to those songs. Thus, it is by virtue of the versatility
of their products that the manufacturers and distributors of today's PCs
are not required to (1) contribute to the compensatory royalty fund of the

AHRA or (2) incorporate the SCMS systems mandated by the AHRA.
B.

DigitalPerformanceRight in Sound RecordingsAct of 1995

°
The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995""
has immediate implications for the realm of digital music piracy, but is
limited in its scope to digital copying by the "uploader,"'' ° not by the
"downloaders"' 6 who represent the main focus of this Comment. 7
Outlining the basic purview of this amendment to the Copyright Act will
allow a more complete understanding of the current status of this issue.

100. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(A)(i) (1994).
101. Id.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
103. The primary purpose provision and the material object provision appear to
accomplish the same goal: exempting personal computers from the AHRA. The reason
for the existence of both provisions is unclear.
104. Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered

sections of 17 U.S.C.).

105. The term uploading refers to transferring a digital file onto a server or Web
site; hence, the effect (whether brought about by a commercial Web site host or by a
private user posting a file to a bulletin board) is to make the file available to others.
106. Conversely, downloading occurs when an end user copies or takes a digital file
onto their own (personal) computer.

107. The distinction between uploaders and downloaders is, of course, somewhat
artificial; a downloader may become an uploader at a moment's notice, thereby taking
his actions out of the realm of home recording and into the realm of Internet copyright
infringement.
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The bundle of rights granted to a musical work's copyright holder has
long included the exclusive rights "to perform the copyrighted work
'
publicly"'' and "to display the copyrighted work publicly."'O
The
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 expanded
upon this by adding an exclusive right "to perform [sound recordings]

publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.""

This new right

applies "in the case of sound recordings,"' . and hence may belong to
someone other than the owner of the copyrights to the underlying
musical work.112 Essentially, the effect of the Act is that Web site

owners (and other non-exempted..3 digital music transmittors) wishing to
"webcast" recorded music via the Internet "should obtain a license
authorizing the public performance of the recording from the owner of
the copyright in the sound recording""' in addition to obtaining a license
from the owner of the copyright in the underlying musical work."5
A brief look at the legislative intent behind this Act reveals its
orientation toward online content providers rather than individual Web
surfers.116

108. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5).
110. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (Supp. IV 1998).
111. Id.
112. The distinction between musical works and sound recordings is not complex:
the term "musical work" refers to the song itself, in its most abstract form, whereas the
"sound recording" (or "master") is the embodiment or fixation of that work onto a
recorded medium. See definitions in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Typically, a songwriter
owns the copyright for the musical works that she composes (unless, of course, it is a
"work for hire" or is otherwise assigned to a third party) while the recording company
that pays for the production, manufacturing, and distribution of the phonorecords
containing those songs owns the rights to exploit those sound recordings. See PASSMAN,
supra note 85, at 197. Before 1995, the rights to license the performance of a song
belonged exclusively to the owner of the underlying composition. Hence, radio stations

that broadcast Stairway to Heaven must pay performance royalties to Jimmy Page and

Robert Plant, the song's composers, even though Atlantic Records owned the sound

recording that was being "performed." LED ZEPPELIN, Stairway to Heaven, on LED
ZEPPELIN IV (Atlantic Records 1971).
113. For a complete list of the rather complicated exemptions afforded by the
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act, see 17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998).
114. Heather D. Rafter et al., Streaming into the Future: Music and Video on the
Internet,547 PLI/PAT. 605, 618 (1999).
115. See id. at 617-18.
116. See H.R. REP. No. 104-274, at 10-11 (1995). Although Web surfing is often a
passive exercise, it may also involve the active steps of posting files to bulletin boards; in
the case of e-mail, it is increasingly common to send attachment files which may
incorporate copyrighted materials.
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Congress began to recognize the vitality and growth of digital transmission
services like "music-on-demand" and "pay-per-listen." Congress predicted that
interactive services are most likely to have a significant impact on traditional

record sales and therefore pose the greatest threat to the livelihood of those
whose income depends on revenues derived from traditional record sales. In
recognition of this potential for impact on revenues, Congress specifically
excluded interactive services from the limitations placed on the new exclusive
performance rights in sound recordings.'17

Practically speaking, it is much easier to identify, and collect damages
from, commercial service providers and Web hosts than it is to ascertain
which (potentially anonymous) individual may have posted an infringing
file. Hence, "so far the trend has been to ignore the direct infringers and
sue the bulletin board and/or the on-line server.""' Moreover, the online
provider is also in a much better position to prevent infringement by
self-policing its sites for illegally posted materials." 9
Thus, the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995
is geared toward recognition of a new type of right held by copyright
owners.'20 The resulting need for Web hosts to acquire a license prior to
webcasting copyrighted sound recordings will generate additional
revenues for copyright holders (generally, in this instance, recording
companies).'' This Act does not have a direct impact on the issue of
device,"'2
whether a PC should be considered a "digital audio recording
and thus does not directly affect the problem of AHRA-sanctioned
digital music piracy.

117. Andrew Hartman, Don't Worry, Be Happy! Music Performance and
Distributionon the Internet is ProtectedAfter the Digital PerformanceRights in Sound

Recordings Act of 1995, 7 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 37, 59-60 (1996) (citations
omitted).
118.

Adam P. Segal, Disseminationof DigitizedMusic on the Internet:A Challenge

to the CopyrightAct, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HiGH TECH. L.J. 97, 126 (1996).
Segal points to an early example of this trend in the case of Frank Music v. CompuServe,
No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 29, 1993), in which CompuServe (who settled)
was targeted for contributory infringement based in part on the plaintiff's perception of
their "deep pocket[s]." Id. Although Segal distinguishes between direct infringers (i.e.,
personal computer users who make copies of protected materials) and on-line providers
(who are infringing indirectly, by making the copyrighted materials available for others
to copy), the traditional division of infringers into "direct" and "indirect" may not apply
completely in the Internet context. That is, the online provider must have made a copy in
the first place, and hence is both a direct and an indirect infringer.
119. See Jonathan Gilbert, Note, Computer Bulletin Board OperatorLiability for
User Misuse, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 439, 441 (1985-1986).

120.

17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (Supp. IV 1998).

121.

See supra note 112.

122.
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C. No Electronic Theft Act of 1997
'
Enacted in December of 1997, the No Electronic Theft ("NET") Actlu
made a number of changes to titles 17 and 18 of the U.S. Code,
"providing enhanced [copyright and trademark] protection in the digital
age."' 2 4 Essentially, the focus of the NET Act was on criminalizing
certain willful reproductions and distributions of protected works."z
Although this Act does not have a direct impact on the central issue of
this Comment (i.e., the PC exemption of the AHRA), the general
relevance of the NET Act to the subject of digital music piracy merits a
brief overview.
The NET Act added a definition of the term "financial gain"' 26 to 17
U.S.C. § 101: "The term 'financial gain' includes receipt, or expectation
of receipt, of anything of value, including the receipt of other
copyrighted works."'27 The explicit inclusion of "anything of value,
including the receipt of other copyrighted works" clearly brings barteroriented acts of infringement into the realm of punishable Copyright Act
violations; hence, infringers whose profit is derived from trading illegal
copies, rather
than directly selling them for cash, may not avoid
1
liability. 2
The NET Act next amended 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) so that individuals
willfully reproducing or distributing copyrighted works, "including by
electronic means, ' ,129 are criminally liable (under 18 U.S.C. § 2319) for
such infringements only if the retail value of the infringed works

exceeds $1000;"3' hence, small-time operators are now exempt from
criminal liability for copyright infringement.'
123. Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).
124. Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The
No Electronic Theft ("NET") Act: Summary of Changes to the Criminal Copyright and
Trademark Laws (visited June 14, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/netsum.htm> (summarizing recent changes in federal law) [hereinafter NET
Act: Summary of Changes].
125. See id.
126. Pub. L. No. 105-147, § 2, 111 Stat. 2678.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1998).
128. See NETAct: Summary of Changes, supranote 124.
129. Pub. L. No. 105-147, § 2, 111 Stat. 2678.
130. See id.
131. In August, 1999, a 22-year-old college student in Portland, Oregon, was
convicted of "illegally distributing movies, music and software programs from his Web
site in what federal prosecutors said was the first Internet piracy conviction under [the
NET Act]." William McCall, Student, 22, Pleads Guilty in Internet Piracy Case, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TuRB., Aug. 21, 1999, at A3. Even though this individual was not charging
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D. DigitalMillennium CopyrightAct of 1998
Enacted in October, 1998, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA")'32 is a complex package of amendments and additions geared
toward bringing copyright law up to date with the explosion of digital
modes of expression, communication, and (of course) copying.'33 On its
face, the primary objective of the DMCA is to implement two World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") treaties. It also includes
the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act,'35 the
Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance Act, 36 and various other
provisions "relating to the functions of the Copyright Office, distance
education, the exceptions in the Copyright Act for libraries and for
making ephemeral recordings, [and] 'webcasting' of sound recordings
on the Internet."' 37 Due to its great magnitude and the fact that only bits
and pieces of it relate to the issue of digital piracy, this Comment
discusses only the relevant portions of the DMCA.
The two WIPO treaties implemented by the DMCA are the WIPO
Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms

Treaty."' The fundamental purpose of these treaties, which were agreed
upon in Geneva, Switzerland, in December, 1996,139 is to ensure that
each member country adequately provides for the protection (in digital
media) of copyrights held lawfully in the other member countries.'
This goal is achieved in the United States by the addition of a new
chapter to Title 17 of the U.S. Code. 4' Primarily, the new chapter,
entitled Copyright Protection and Management Systems, 42 proscribes
"circumvent[ion of] a technological measure that effectively controls
for the pirated works that he distributed through his Web site, he was convicted of
criminal copyright infringement: the NET Act "makes it illegal to reproduce or distribute
copyrighted works, even if they are distributed without charge." Id. Hence, because
thousands of copyrighted works were involved, the $1000 threshold was exceeded,
resulting in criminal liability even in the absence of a profit motive.
132. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
133. For an excellent (and relatively brief) analysis of the scope of changes effected
by the DMCA, see Mark Radcliffe, Digital Millennium Copyright Act Forging the
Copyright Frameworkfor the Internet: FirstSteps, 557 PLI/PAT. 365 (1999).
134. See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860.
135. Id.

136. Id.

137. U.S. Copyright Office, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S.
Copyright Office Summary, at 1 (December 1998) <http://Icweb.loc.gov/copyright>
[hereinafter DMCA Summary]. This wonderful 18-page document makes it possible to
get the gist of the DMCA relatively quickly and painlessly.
138. Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 102, 112 Stat. 2860, 2861-62.

139. See id. at 2862.
140.

See DMCA Summary, supra note 137, at 2.

142.

17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (Supp. IV 1998).

141.
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access to a work protected under this title."'43 Moreover, Chapter 12

states that "[n]o person shall manufacture [or] import... any
technology, product, service, [or] device.., primarily designed or
produced for the purpose of circumventing protection afforded by a

technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright
owner under this title... ."'44 Hence, both the importation of devices
that circumvent copyright protection measures and the act itself of45
circumventing such technology are targeted by chapter 12 of 17 U.S.C.'
It must be noted, however, that nothing in the DMCA requires the
implementation of any particular technological copyright control
measures; '46 rather, the focus of the Act is on preventing the
circumvention 4of
7 any such measures as are voluntarily adopted by

manufacturers.

The DMCA also proscribes the tampering with or alteration of
copyright management information ("CMI"), whether printed visibly on

the packaging of a product or encoded digitally within the underlying
file.' 48 Currently, the existence of digitally encoded copyright information
(i.e., digital watermarking systems) is the exception rather than the
rule; 49 hence, at least for the moment, the effect of 17 U.S.C. § 1202 is

generally limited to the non-digital types of CMI (i.e., the title and
author of the work and other information which may appear
externally). 150
143. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1998). This anti-circumvention portion of
the DMCA, generally referred to as the "black box" provision, is "meant to protect the
emerging class of technical methods (frequently referred to as 'digital envelopes' or
'digital objects') which are being used to protect digital works both on the Internet and
on other media." Radcliffe, supra note 133, at 385-86.
145. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205.
146.

See DMCA Summary, supra note 137, at 4.

147. See id. See also infra Part VI (discussing the Secure Digital Music Initiative).
148. See 17 U.S.C. § 1202.
149. A digital watermark "imprints a unique identifier into a song file." GRAVES,
supra note 11, at 9. "As a result, a watermark survives most types of copying, and
permits anti-piracy authorities to determine the source of a particular file no matter how
many times it has been copied. ... " Id. Most compact discs currently in existence,
however, were manufactured before the threat of digital piracy necessitated such
measures, and hence will be forever vulnerable. In the future, it is likely that CMI
systems such as those foreseen by the DMCA will be increasingly common, as "the
recording industry is developing a standardized watermark system that [will be encoded]
into all new songs during the mastering process." Id. At that point, the anti-CMI
tampering measures of the DMCA will perhaps have a significant impact on digital
music piracy.
150. See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c).
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Because personal computers are exempt from the AHRA, they do not
need to incorporate the serial copying prevention mechanisms that are
otherwise mandated by that act.15"' To some extent, this may be
incongruous with the intentions of the DMCA; although the DMCA
proscribes tampering with such systems, the AHRA explicitly excludes
PCs from the group of devices that must incorporate these measures. If
the PC exemption were eliminated, the AHRA and DMCA would work
synergistically toward furthering copyright protection in the digital age.
Although there is no clear reason for the existence of this anomaly,
there are at least two possible explanations. First, it is possible that the
full effect of the AHRA's PC exemption had not yet been realized at the
time of the DMCA's passage. The advent of MP3 technology, which
became popular in this context only after the enactment of the DMCA,
illuminated the negative implications of that exemption. Hence, the
conflict between the AHRA and the DMCA may be the result of a
congressional oversight. Second, one may speculate that Congress was
aware of this conflict but chose not to end the AHRA's PC exemption
due to pressure from the computer manufacturing industry.
V. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF RELEVANT LEGISLATION

A.

Sony Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios, Inc.

In 1983, the Supreme Court heard arguments, by copyright holders
and technology manufacturers, that resemble the issues raised today by
digital music piracy.) 2 This case truly set the stage for judicial
interpretation of the new generation of copyright law. The subject
matter of the case was home taping of television shows using video tape
recorders (VTRs, now known as video cassette recorders or VCRs).'
The original plaintiffs (Universal et al.) were copyright holders of
television shows and films who believed that Sony's new technology
would lead to infringement of these copyrights.'
That is, Universal
argued that consumers were using Sony's Betamax VTRs "to record
some of [Universal's] copyrighted works... thereby infring[ing
Universal's] copyrights."' 55 Universal believed that the manufacturers of
devices used by consumers to make copies of protected works should be
responsible for compensating the copyright holders for their lost

151.
152.

See 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994).
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).

153.

See id. at 420.

154.
155.

See id.
Id. at 420.
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royalties;'56 Universal did not seek relief from the consumer.'57
Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Sony's
manufacture and sale of Betamax machines did constitute contributory
infringement,'5 8 the Supreme Court reversed.'59 The key language of the
decision came in the Court's recognition that, for the majority of
Betamax users, the primary use of the machine was "time-shifting,"
which is:
the practice of recording a program to view it once at a later time, and thereafter

erasing it. Time-shifting enables viewers to see programs they otherwise would
miss because they are not at home, are occupied with other tasks, or are viewing
a program on another station at the time of a broadcast that they desire to
watch.' 60

The television programs at issue were initially broadcast to be viewed
free of charge. Following the district court's findings,' 6' the Supreme
Court reasoned that a device that allowed a consumer to view such a
show at the time of his or her choosing did not represent a significant
negative impact on licensing revenues.' 6 That is, there was no
convincing evidence that time-shifting would result in less television
viewing, so that the advertisement-based revenue scheme underlying the
licensing of the protected works faced no obvious threat as a result of the
sale of Betamax units.1 63

156.

See id. The same position was taken by the copyright holders in Recording

Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 624 (C.D. Cal.
1998). See infra Part V.B.
157. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 420. In Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 29 F.
Supp. 2d at 625, the suit arose before the product hit the market; nevertheless, it is safe to
assume that even if the timing had been different, the plaintiffs would have recognized
the futility (not to mention the public relations nightmare) of going after consumers
rather than the manufacturer of the device.
158. See Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 975 (9th
Cir. 1981). The infringement was contributory for the obvious reason that Sony was not
accused of directly making the offending copies themselves; rather, they provided
consumers (the direct infringers) with the tools necessary to infringe Universal's
copyrights.
159. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 421.
160. Id. at 423.
161. See Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 469 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
162. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 456.
163. See id.
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B. Recording Industry Ass'n ofAmerica v.
DiamondMultimedia Systems

In 1998, Diamond Multimedia Systems ("Diamond") was on the verge
of manufacturing and distributing a portable device (the "Rio") capable
of recording and playing back MP3 files.' Weighing only ounces, the

Rio connects to a PC, receives copies of MP3 files from the hard drive,
and then (after disconnecting from the PC) allows the user to listen to
the recordings via headphones. 6 The Recording Industry Association of

America ("RIAA"), an association representing the major U.S. recording
companies, became aware of this product; fearing that it would lead to
significant illicit copying of the copyrighted music owned in large part

by the major recording companies, RJAA sought a preliminary
injunction preventing Diamond from releasing the Rio.' 66
The district court denied the motion for the injunction,'67 but made
some interesting comments along the way. Having acknowledged the
deliberate PC exemption of the AHRA, " ' the court then considered

Diamond's argument that because the songs played by a Rio come from
a PC, and because a PC is not a "digital audio recording device," the Rio
does not make copies of "digital audio recordings."' 69 Essentially,
Diamond argued that the Rio cannot be considered a digital audio
recording device, and hence should be exempt from the auspices of the

AHRA"' ° The court noted that this result could not be what Congress
intended, because it would basically nullify the AHRA due to the fact
that "[a]ny recording device could evade AHRA regulation simply by
passing the music through a computer and ensuring that the MP3 file

resided momentarily on the hard drive."' 7 '
In the end, the district court denied RTAA's request for a temporary

164. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 1998). MP3 files, as discussed previously, are compact,
digitized sound recordings that can be copied and transmitted easily and quickly between
personal computers and over the Internet. See supra Part III.C.
165. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 625. The Recording
Industry Association of America chose to seek injunctive relief under the AHRA rather
than pursuing a traditional copyright infringement claim because the AHRA forces this
choice; that is, the AHRA explicitly prohibits copyright infringement claims. See 17
U.S.C. § 1008 (1994). Hence, rather than attack the Rio preemptively for contributory
infringement, RIAA sought to receive a judgment that the device was in violation of the
AHRA and therefore could not be released commercially. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of
Am., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 625-26.
166. See Recording Indus.Ass'n ofAm., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 625-26.
167. See id. at 625.
168. See supra Part IV.A.3.
169. See Recording Indus.Ass'n ofAm., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 628.
170. See id.
171. Id. at 630.
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injunction in spite of its conclusion that the Rio probably is a DAR

device.' 72 The court found that RIAA "established a probability that the

Rio is a 'digital audio recording device," '13 but that granting an
injunction preventing the release of the Rio would be pointless, noting
that "incorporating SCMS into the Rio appears an exercise in futility.'

Continuing, the court stated that "[b]ecause a Rio with SCMS would not
violate [the SCMS requirement of the AHRA], and because a Rio
without SCMS is functionally equivalent to a Rio with SCMS,"'75 the
Rio did not presumptively violate the AHRA. 78 Nevertheless, the court
recognized "the Rio's [potential] contribution to the traffic in illegal
MP3 files,"' 7 opining that "[t]his type of injury is precisely why the
AHRA provides for royalties."'7'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals approved of the district court's

assessment that the Rio did not violate the AHRA's SCMS
requirement1 79 and agreed that the Rio should not be blocked from
entering the market."

However, while the district court had rejected

Diamond's argument that the Rio is not a DAR device,"' the Ninth
Circuit reached the opposite conclusion."2 The Ninth Circuit noted that
the [AHRA] seems designed to allow files to be "laundered" by passage through
a computer, because even a device with SCMS would be able to download MP3
files lacking SCMS codes from a computer hard drive, for the simple reason
that there would be no codes to prevent the copying."'

Finally, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the district court's recognition
172. See id. at 633.
173. Id. at 632.
174. Id.
175. Id. Because the Rio lacks the capacity to output its MP3 files to other devices,
it technically meets the SCMS requirement of the AHRA, which essentially mandates
that a DAR device be incapable of allowing further downstream copying. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 1002(a)(3) (1994).
176. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 632.

177. Id. at 627.
178. Id. The basic requirement of the AHRA (other than the SCMS element) is its
compensation (royalty fund) element; thus, the district court reasoned that if the Rio
were a DAR device, then the appropriate result would be for Diamond to pay into the
AHRA royalty fund, not for the court to enjoin the commercial release of the product.
See id.

179. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180
F.3d 1072, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1999).
180. See id. at 1081.
181. See Recording Indus.Ass'n of Am., 29 F. Supp. 2d at 628.
182. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 180 F.3d at 1081.
183. Id. at 1079.
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of the PC exemption as essentially eviscerating the AHRA, but
concluded that "[w]hile this may be true, the Act seems to have been
expressly designed to create this loophole."'
This case is distinguishable from the larger issue of digital music
piracy enabled by the AHRA's PC exemption because of the Rio's lack

of downstream capability. That is, although the Rio cannot output the
digital sound files that it contains (hence making any concern about
serial copying using a Rio moot), a computer (or network of computers,

whether Internet or Intranet) is capable of infinite output. A PC not only
can output DARs to other particular PCs, but also can output them to the
whole world by uploading them to a Web site or bulletin board.'5

Although such uploading may be considered an infringement of
copyright under the DMCA,' the Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act, 8 ' or the NET Act,'88 it seems frivolous to allow these
acts of copying to evade the AHRA due to its PC exemption. Moreover,

the purpose of the AHRA is distinct from that of traditional copyright
law; while the latter is geared toward deterring and punishing infringing

behavior, the former seeks (1) to implement technical measures to
prevent infringing behavior, and (2) to compensate copyright holders for
instances of infringing behavior that cannot be prevented.'89 Thus,
though acts of copying that take advantage of the AHRA's PC

exemption may be punishable by other copyright provisions, the
avoidance of the AHRA does constitute a separate set of negative
184. Id. at 1078.
185. Additionally, the online service Napster, which erupted after the Rio litigation,
allows MP3 users to share their files directly with one another, without needing to utilize
a bulletin board or a Web site. See supra note 85. "Napster ensures the availability of
every song online by connecting you live with millions of songs found in other MP3
listeners' music collections. With Napster, you'll never come up empty handed when
searching for your favorite music again!"
Napster (visited Nov. 14, 1999)
<http://www.napster.com>. Napster's copyright policy explicitly claims to be in
compliance with the DMCA due to its lack of control over the content which may be
accessed through it. See Napster Copyright Policy (visited June 17, 2000)
<http://www.napster.com/dmca.html>. Moreover, it encourages users to "download
Napster now to start building your MP3 collection today-faster and easier than you
ever dreamed possible!" So, What the Heck is Napster? (visited June 17, 2000)
<http://www.napster.com/whatisnapster.html>. Of course, copying the aforementioned

MP3 files will generate no royalties for the copyright holder due to the fact that they are

not made by a "digital audio recording device" under the AHRA's definitions. See 17
U,S.C. § 1001 (1994); see also supra Part IV.A.3. The emergence of Napster therefore
illustrates both the ease and speed with which a PC user may build a library of illegal
recordings, and the failure of current copyright law to discourage such piracy or to

compensate copyright holders in the manner intended by the AHRA.
186. Pub. L. No. 105-134, 112 Stat. 1860 (1998). See supra Part IV.D.
187.
sections
188.
189.
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Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered
of 17 U.S.C.). See supra Part IV.B.
Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997). See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part IV.A.2.
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consequences. Congress should close down this exemption and accept
the obvious: PCs make digital audio recordings and will be increasingly
instrumental in digital music piracy in the coming years unless it is made
absolutely clear that this will not be tolerated. The DMCA and the NET
Act do not accomplish this goal directly, and the existence of the AHRA
in its presently eviscerated condition may do more harm than good. By
providing an illogical loophole through which current and future
generations of digital audio pirates can skirt the AHRA, Congress is
sending a mixed message. Rules that are inconsistent are inherently
weak and confusing; allowing some instances of illegal copying (i.e.,
those made using a PC) to be nonviolative of the AHRA wil have a
legitimizing effect on that infringing behavior, which in turn wil
undermine the broader goal of discouraging such behavior.
VI. THE SECURE DIGITAL MusIc INrIATIvE
The Secure Digital Music Initiative ("SDMI") represents the music
industry's attempt to get together and find a way to prevent digital music
piracy.90 The focus is on getting the necessary technology in place so
that digital music piracy will become a non-issue, or at least very
difficult to accomplish."' The key technologies being explored are
"digital watermarking" and encryption.'9
Watermarking is an old
technology, having been used for centuries on paper currency. Digital
watermarking involves encoding CDs (and any other form of sound
files) with information about the copyright status of the recording, and
whether or not it can be copied.'9
There is some skepticism about
whether technological measures could ever adequately prevent digital
music piracy from occurring. "'
Even if such technologies were
190. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., SDMI: Overview (visited Aug. 28, 2000)
<http://www.riaa.com/Music-SDMI-l.cfin>.
191. See id.
192.

See GRAVES, supra note 11, at 8.

193. See id. at 9.
194. See id. at 8-11. Also, consider the recent emergence of software capable of
cracking the encryption of all DVDs. See Bloomberg News, Hollywood Studios Allege
DVD Piracy in Suit (visited Jan. 17, 2000) <http:llnews.cnet.com/news/0-1006-2021523695.html>. The software, which was made available by three New Yorkers via the
World-Wide Web (who, as a result, are being sued by eight major film studios),
"unscrambles a security code on DVDs that is supposed to prevent their duplication." Id.
On the offending Web site, one of the defendants allegedly encouraged DVD piracy,
stating, "Yes, you can trade DVD files over the Internet. You can break the encryption
on any DVD." Id.
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implemented, they would affect only new releases. The recording
industry may be willing to write off their entire back catalogs (in terms
of digital piracy) due to the reality that they cannot go back and put
watermarks on all the CDs that are already out there.19 Hence, though
the SDMI may in the future increase the difficulty of copying from CDs
(as well as from other digital formats), it does not represent a complete

solution to this problem."6

VII. DISCUSSION
Fueled both by the omnipresence in modem society of high-speed
computers with high-speed connections to each other and by the
popularity of
MP3 audio compression technology, digital music piracy is
"rampant."'97 Unlike the music pirates of previous decades, today's
music pirates are predominately consumers seeking to acquire personal
use of copyrighted recordings for free or in exchange for providing
access to recordings that they already possess. Current copyright law
does not provide the tools necessary to combat this trend; bringing
infringement actions against consumers involves problems of proof,
judicial economy, and public relations. The drafters of the Audio Home
Recording Act recognized the danger of serial digital copying, and the
AHRA represents a positive step toward addressing the unique problem
posed by consumer access to digital audio recording devices. The
exemption of PCs from the AHRA, though perhaps of minor practical
significance in 1992, has developed into a major loophole which will
prevent the Act from having any meaningful impact on this problem in
the coming years. This statutory loophole should be closed, resulting in
the following primary effects: (1) PC manufacturers will be required to
incorporate Serial Copying Management Systems (SCMS), in order to
thwart the serial copyability of digital music files via their products; (2)
PC manufacturers will be required to contribute a percentage of their
sales revenues into the AHRA's royalty fund, in order to compensate
copyright holders for the lost revenues which will inevitably occur as
some degree of digital music piracy continues; and (3) a legal absurdism
will end.

195. Telephone Interview with Mark Mooradian, Senior Analyst, Jupiter
Communications (Aug. 4,1999).
196. Skepticism about the SDMI's ability to thwart digital music piracy abounds:
"Any system that can be invented to tag music can be hacked to remove the tags."
Wendy M. Grossman, Cyber View: Putting the Squeeze on Music, Sci. AM., May 1999,

at 38.

197. Sara Robinson, MP3.com Plans Net Service for Music Swapping, SAN DIEGO
UNIoN-Tam., Jan. 12, 2000, at Cl.
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A.

Incorporationof Serial Copying ManagementSystems

The logic behind the SCMS requirement is strong: those who
introduce into the marketplace a product capable of making infinite,
perfect copies of copyright-protected materials should make a strong
effort not to enable would-be pirates to use that product for illegal
copying. The emphasis of the AHRA's SCMS requirement is therefore
on prevention of serial copying. As was decided in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,'98 a single copy for personal use
may be presumed to be a non-infringing fair use.'
Rather, it is the
copying of a copy (with no concurrent loss of fidelity) that the SCMS
requirement seeks to prevent.
Certainly, some technology products might not be able to prevent their
own illicit use. Photocopiers, for example, may be fundamentally
incapable of identifying a piece of paper containing a protected image.
Personal computers, on the other hand, are inherently "smart" machines
that are eminently trainable. PC manufacturers could implement some
unobtrusive method of identifying illegitimate music files. All PCs (or,
perhaps more accurately, their operating systems) already identify
countless file characteristics (e.g., Windows versus Macintosh, software
of origin) as part of their regular operations. By working in conjunction
with the programmers of the system software packages used by their
machines, or with the researchers currently at work on the SDMI project,
an industry standard for identifying illegitimate audio files could be
achieved.
The truly forward-thinking computer manufacturing industries might
incorporate SCMS measures on their own initiative, perhaps working
with the recording7 and music publishing20 ' industries to develop the
best possible standards of encryption and digital watermarking.2 By
doing so, manufacturers could attempt to negotiate their way into an
optimal position with respect to the royalty fund requirement of the
AHRA, while simultaneously reining in the infringing activities that
198.
199.
200.

464 U.S. 417,433 (1984).
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
The RIAA is the logical representative of the recording industry as a whole.

201. Broadcast Music Incorporated (BMI) and the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) are the two entities responsible for collecting and
distributing performance-related royalties to musical copyright holders. See PASSM1AN,

supranote 85, at 233-37.
202.

The SDMI does represent an attempt at this, but appears to lack momentum.
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their products are enabling.
The astute critic of this scheme should point out that MP3 files contain
no SCMS information, thus rendering any requirement for PCs to
incorporate SCMS technology useless. That is, how can my PC
ascertain the legitimacy of an MP3 file if MP3 files by their nature
contain no SCMS information? The best counterargument is that there
will always be instances of technological evasion, and the AHRAmandated royalty fund is a valid way of addressing the inequities created
by such instances of illegal copying. Based in part on the likelihood that
future generations of MP3-like files will incorporate SCMS information,.0 3
it makes sense to require personal computers to be SCMS compliant. Of
course, if such actions were purely voluntary, then those PCs that did not
incorporate SCMS systems would potentially be more marketable than
their SCMS-compliant competitors. By requiring all PCs to comply
with the AHRA's SCMS requirement, any potential advantage for
makers of noncompliant machines would be eliminated.
B. Payments to the AHRA-Mandated Royalty Fund
Requiring manufacturers of consumer goods to bear the cost of the
externalities resulting from their products is not a novel concept.
Indeed, the rise of PCs resembles the development of the railroads in the
19th century. In its infancy, society was well-served by allowing both
industries to move forward freely, unimpeded by burdensome regulation.
But just as the railroads eventually were forced to take full responsibility
for all the results (i.e., accidents and destruction) of their actions once
the underlying industry was firmly established, so too should computer
manufacturers and related industries bear the costs associated with their
businesses. Holding PC makers accountable under the same system in
which manufacturers of other digital recording devices are held
responsible represents a significant step toward this logical goal.
It is true that, unlike DAT and CD-R machines, PCs are not used
exclusively for making digital audio recordings. It would seem fair to
allow some type of proration to take this into account. The important
thing to recognize is that, one way or another, the consumer will
inevitably end up bearing part of the cost associated with lost copyright

203. Although MP3 files, which will likely be in existence for years to come, lack
generation status and other digitally watermarked information necessary to prevent

illegal copying, the next generations of digitally compressed audio files are already

appearing. See GRAVES, supra note 11, at 13-15. Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) and
MPEG-4 are two examples of such future improvements on MP3 compression, and are
favored by recording companies, not only for their superior sound quality but also
because of their encryption potential. See id.
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value. Whether or not the manufacturers are required to pay into the
AHRA fund, the net result, to some degree, will be increased price to the
consumer.2
Nevertheless, this is a more just result than allowing
computer manufacturers and consumer freeloaders to profit at the
expense of music copyright holders.
The royalty fund component of the AHRA is purely anticipatory. It
requires manufacturers of devices that will inevitably be used for illegal
copying to share a percentage of their revenues with the copyright
holders whose intellectual property drives, in part, the demand for those
devices. In a perfectly efficient economy, this cost will be passed on to
the consumer. Because all manufacturers of digital audio recording
devices are required to participate in the AHRA, theoretically they will
all raise the price of their goods to defray the royalty fund requirement.
Thus, consumers (some of whom are the source of the lost royalties
which necessitate the fund in the first place) will ultimately pay their
own way. In the event that PC manufacturers continue to be exempt
from the AHRA's royalty fund, the cost of acquiring legitimate
copyrighted materials will rise.20 5 Hence, the loss caused by the piracy
will still be borne by the consumer. The strongest argument for passing
the loss on to the consumer by way of the AHRA royalty fund rather
than by way of natural (i.e., nonregulatory) economics is one of
consistency: the AHRA exists and is a manifestation of Congress'
attempt to address legislatively a recognized problem. As such, it makes
sense for that solution to be applied in all contexts in which the problem
occurs. The use of the royalty fund to remedy the loss of DAT-based
piracy but not of PC-based piracy is undesirable for its inconsistency, if
nothing else.
Arguably, the same result could be achieved by deregulating digital
audio recording devices altogether. Record companies could charge

thirty dollars for a single compact disc, thereby passing the loss caused
by digital music piracy on to the consumer, who has to pay more for the
204. Consider, for example, the price of a new piece of software, which may range
from $30 to $300 or more for a single CD. Compared to the price of a music CD,
roughly $15, software is expensive. This may reflect the fact that software companies,
who have grown accustomed to piracy of their wares, have increased the price of their
product to reflect the lost revenues resulting from that inevitable piracy. Software is
designed to be "loaded" onto a computer's hard drive, thus lending itself to a relatively
high level of "loading" by users other than the purchaser. This phenomenon has only
recently spread to digital music piracy, and therefore music recording companies are still
coming to grips with its financial implications.
205. See supra note 204.
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CD, and the PC manufacturers, who will sell fewer machines due to the
higher cost of associated products. The logic of closing the AHRA's PC
exemption seems stronger, however. If nothing else, it at least sends the
message that Congress will not turn a blind eye to the illegal degradation
of copyright. Though one may argue that a legislative solution is
inherently more cumbersome than other possible solutions (i.e., letting
the price naturally reach the equilibrium which reflects all related
externalities, such as the loss caused by piracy), in this case the
legislative machinery of the AHRA is already in place. In this respect,
closing the loophole represents a highly efficient solution inasmuch as it
merely extends existing law to the full extent of its logical reach.
C. Ending the PC Exemption Will End a Legal Absurdism
It is difficult to respect, or perhaps even to obey, laws that create legal
absurdisms or are internally inconsistent. Fundamentally, a law that
says that "X is not X" cheapens those who follow it, those who drafted it,
and the system that supports it. By defining "digital audio recording
devices" so as not to include PCs, Congress has created just such an
absurdism. Though it was not so obviously the case at the time the
AHRA was drafted, it is absolutely obvious now that personal computers
are in fact the ultimate digital audio recording devices. Thousands
(perhaps millions) of digital audio recordings are copied, shared, and
transmitted every day.
In addition to benefiting the general purposes of truth and logic,
ending the legal absurdism of the AHRA PC exemption will also have a
more practical result: it will end the potential for PCs to be used to
launder music files in evasion of the AHRA. As the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals recognized in Recording Industry Ass'n of America v.
Diamond Multimedia Systems, °6 this potential remains very real as a
result of the fact that any musical file which resides even momentarily
on a PC's hard drive is effectively removed from the auspices of the
AHRA for the rest of its existence.
D. The Weakness ofAlternative Approaches
Some people may recoil at the thought of a regulatory solution to a
problem such as digital music piracy. Indeed, why not just let the
market price of copyrighted goods naturally adjust itself to reflect the
losses created by piracy?' Hasn't this approach worked reasonably
206.

180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).

207. See supra note 204.
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well in the case of software?' While this may be a valid point in and of
itself, it fails in this context simply because the AHRA exists; given that
the AHRA represents Congress' solution to the problem of digital music

piracy, this legislation should be updated as necessary to allow it to
achieve its intended goal. Ending the PC exemption certainly represents
a less dramatic way of addressing the problem of PC-based music piracy
then scrapping the entire AHRA, although that too would at least
produce a consistent result.
The argument can also be made that it is the obligation of copyright
holders, not hardware and software manufacturers, to protect their own
materials. Why not require record companies to make commercially
released recordings harder to copy? The answer is that PCs are
fundamentally versatile tools, and that methods of de-encryption will
always arise.2°9 For this reason, the AHRA's royalty fund is a sensible
way of addressing the problem of digital music piracy. Notwithstanding
the current AHRA definition, PCs are digital audio recording devices,
and therefore should not be exempt from this fund.
It is possible to question the wisdom of having extensive copyright
protection. For those individuals who believe that intellectual property
belongs in the public domain and should not receive such strong
statutory protection, the ability of consumers to make perfect serial
copies may seem like a desirable result. However, it is beyond the scope
of this Comment to entertain such a fundamental evaluation of American
copyright law. Rather, this Comment recognizes that the current system
is based on providing such protection for intellectual property and that
the AHRA, as a recent attempt to allow that system to function
efficiently in the digital age, is an inconsistent and flawed measure in its
present form. Thus, rather than engage in a "law and economics"
analysis of whether society might experience a net benefit through a
reduction in the amount of copyright protection given to music,. ° this
Comment relies on the assumption that the current level of protection is
efficient.
208. See id.
209. See GRAVES, supra note 11, at 10.
210. For example, it is possible that a musician's incentive to create music stems
from the intrinsic need of an artist to create, as opposed to the more pecuniary
motivations underlying, say, pharmaceutical research and development. Hence, it may
be that decreased copyright protection for musical works would reduce the cost of
consumer access to those works without significantly chilling the underlying creative
behavior.
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Those who would oppose ending the AHRA's PC exemption may
argue that computers are fundamentally different than other digital audio
recording devices, and that Congress acted correctly in exempting them
from the Act's reach. Indeed, PCs are different than other digital audio
recording devices: they are much more powerful and versatile than
dedicated digital audio recording devices. But this difference actually
argues in favor of ending the exemption. PCs are so much more
powerful and versatile that they may someday drive other digital audio
recording devices into total obsolescence."'
In this author's opinion, a primary reason for the existence of the PC
exemption is that at the time the AHRA was written, PCs were not,
practically speaking, functional as digital audio recording devices.
Today, as a result of advances in the machines themselves and the
growing popularity of MP3 files, they are. Ending the AHRA's PC
exemption is the easiest and the most effective, logical, and consistent
solution to the growing problem of PC-based digital music piracy.
E. Conclusion
When the AHRA was drafted, computers were limited in their ability
to copy and transfer large multimedia files; this is no longer the case. In
just a few more years, using your PC and the Internet to copy CDs will
be even faster and easier than it is today. Just five years ago, advertising
on the Web was unheard of, forbidden by an unwritten law of
netiquette.21 Today, Web advertising is big business, illustrating the
metamorphosis of the Internet from a mode of communication to a major
commercial enterprise zone. The time has come to increase industry
accountability for the hotbed of digital music piracy that it has created.
Eliminating the personal computer exemption of the AHRA is an
appropriate step to take to accomplish this goal. Ultimately, all
parties-consumers, computer manufacturers, artists, and recording
companies-may benefit from an environment in which non-serial
digital copying for personal use is tolerated, commercial distribution of
music online is enabled, and digital music piracy is thwarted.
DAvID A. HEPLER

211. Why bother having a DAT or a DVD player if your PC can perform the same
functions?
212. See Joshua A. Marcus, Note, Commercial Speech on the Internet: Spam and
the FirstAmendment, 16 CARDOzO ARTS & ENr. L.J. 245, 246-47 (1998).
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